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We consider social insurance schemes with a two-part beneﬁtf o r m u l a : a
ﬂat (constant) term and a variable term which is proportional to individu-
als’ contributions. The factor of proportionality deﬁnes the type of social
insurance. We adopt a two-stage political economy approach. At the ﬁrst,
constitutional stage, the type of social insurance is chosen “behind the veil
of ignorance”, according to the Rawlsian or the utilitarian criterion. At this
stage, private insurance can also be prohibited or allowed. At the second
stage, tax rate and beneﬁt level are chosen by majority voting. Three main
results emerge. First, it may be appropriate to adopt a system which is less
redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure political support for
an adequate level of coverage in the second stage. Second, supplementary
private insurance may increase the welfare of the poor, even if it is eﬀectively
bought only by the rich. Third, the case for prohibiting (supplementary) pri-
vate insurance may become stronger when the eﬃciency of private insurance
markets increases.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The future of social insurance systems is a hotly debated issue among eco-
nomists and non-economists alike. One of the prominent issues is that of
the primary function of social insurance: just relief of poverty or, more am-
bitiously, reduction in the uncertainty faced by all individuals. It is often
argued that the appropriate choice between these two approaches involves a
tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency cost (distortions) and political sustainability. The
main argument in favor of the minimal view is that such a social insurance
costs less, and thus requires lower payroll taxes, inducing smaller distortions.
T h em a i na r g u m e n ti nf a v o ro ft h em o r eg e n e r o u sv i e w ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i s
that such a social insurance in the Bismarckian tradition concerns everyone
in society, thus attracts more political support and resists better to its rolling
back.
The purpose of this paper is to study how the issue of political support
aﬀects the design of social insurance systems. In particular, we want to
determine, which type of social insurance system is most suitable to resist to
popular pressures. We ﬁrst address this problem in a setting where private
insurance is potentially available, but may be prohibited.
Social insurance, such as deﬁned here, is ﬁnanced by a proportional pay-
roll tax. It provides beneﬁts that consist of two parts: a ﬂat part and a
variable part that is a fraction of individuals’ contributions. This fraction,
which we call the Bismarckian factor, deﬁnes the type of social insurance
that may range from a ﬂat-rate beneﬁts type to a pure Bismarckian scheme
whereby all beneﬁts are proportional to individuals’ contributions.
We adopt a two-stage political economy approach.1 In the ﬁrst, consti-
tutional stage, the type of social insurance is chosen by people who are to
a large extent uncertain about the implications of alternative types of social
insurance for their own interests. They may therefore be guided by the kind
of justiﬁcations given for utilitarianism or the original position leading to the
maximin criterion. At this constitutional stage, the “behind the veil of igno-
rance” choice is made taking into account the fact that the actual tax rate
and beneﬁt levels will be chosen by majority voting in the second stage. In
the second stage, individuals know exactly where they stand and they vote
accordingly. At this stage, we adopt the median voter model.
1This is often called the “constitutionalist” or the “ﬁscal constitution” approach.
1It will be shown that the political process in the second stage may have a
crucial impact on the constitutional decision pertaining to the social protec-
tion system. If the tax rate could be directly controlled, our setting would
call for a system with ﬂat beneﬁts (i.e. a Bismarckian factor set at zero).
With majority voting in the second stage, on the other hand, the equilib-
rium tax rate is contingent on the Bismarckian factor, but this allows only
for an indirect control. As a consequence, it may be appropriate to adopt a
system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure
political support and thus an adequate level of coverage in the second stage.
The key parameters determining the equilibrium outcome are the earnings
distribution and the concavity of the utility functions. The ﬁnal outcome
we are interested in consists of two terms: the size of the scheme which is
represented by the tax rate and decided by majority voting and the redis-
tributiveness of the scheme, denoted by the Bismarckian factor and chosen
at the constitutional stage.
Whether or not private insurance is available has an important impact on
the outcome. In our model, this issue is also decided constitutionally. Private
insurance is assumed to be costlier than public insurance but tends to be more
attractive for anyone with above-average earnings. We shall show that the
(un)availability of private insurance crucially aﬀe c t st h en a t u r eo ft h ev o t i n g
equilibrium in the second stage. Without private insurance, the individual
with the median income is necessarily pivotal, while other individuals may
be pivotal when private insurance is available. Rather surprisingly it also
turns out that the availability of private insurance may foster, rather than
undermine the political support for social insurance. Finally, it appears
that the case for prohibiting (supplementary) private insurance may become
stronger when the eﬃciency of private insurance markets increases.
The idea that the type of social insurance has an impact on the level of
political support for particular policies is not new. There is a long-standing
debate regarding the relative advantages of alternative beneﬁtf o r m u l a s :n o t
only earnings-related and ﬂat-rate beneﬁts but also means-tested beneﬁts.
Political scientists such as Esping-Andersen (1990) have explored the his-
torical roots of three social protection systems: (i) ﬂat and means-tested
beneﬁts that are rather meager, (ii) earnings-related beneﬁts with high taxes
and (iii) ﬂat beneﬁts with high taxes, putting, e.g., the UK in the ﬁrst, Ger-
many in the second and Sweden in the third category. The problem facing
“political economists” is to explain the emergence of such systems in a posi-
2tive way. Most of the existing theoretical studies deal with the choice between
ﬂat-rate and means-tested beneﬁts. In this choice, the ﬂat-rate formula is
that which provides the wider spread of beneﬁts and is thus likely to attract
the wider political support.
Moene and Wallerstein(1996) adopt a Rawlsian viewpoint to choose be-
tween uniform beneﬁts and means-tested beneﬁts. The most striking result
they obtain is that when means-tested beneﬁts are so low that the probabil-
ity that the median voter will be a welfare recipient is near zero, the median
voter prefers to reduce beneﬁts to zero. They conclude: ”the conservative
ideal of a limited welfare state that pays beneﬁts only to the very poor is
politically unsustainable in the absence of altruistic voting” (p 20). In this
literature, like in our model, voters are indeed assumed to be self-interested.2
To some extent, our paper is also related to another stream of literature
that is concerned with the majority voting choice of public insurance con-
tributions when private insurance is available. More generally, this line of
research studies the equilibrium supply of publicly provided private goods
with or without private supplements and with or without the possibility of
“opting out”. Epple and Romano (1996), for instance, show that a system
of public provision along with private supplements is majority preferred to
either a market-only or a government-only regime. Anderberg (1997) ex-
tends their model to an insurance setting with adverse selection. Compared
to their work, in our paper, the possibility of supplementing social insurance
by a private one is decided at the constitutional level.
Like most of the existing literature, we provide a highly stylized repre-
s e n t a t i o no fs o c i a li n s u r a n c e .O nt h er e v e n u es i d ew ea s s u m eap r o p o r t i o n a l
payroll tax and on the expenditure side, we consider a compensation that
is more or less related to contributions. The compensation is paid in the
bad state of nature, in which an individual loses his earning capacity and
is without resources. Such a scheme is rather close to unemployment and
disability insurance and to a lesser extent to health insurance.
The rest of the paper consists of four sections. Next section presents
the model. In section 3, we consider the case in which private insurance is
unavailable. Section 4 deals with the case where private insurance is available
2De Donder and Hindricks (1998) use an alternative approach wherein both parameters,
the tax rate and the means-test factor, are chosen simultaneously by majority voting. They
expectedly face serious problems of indeterminacy and multiplicity of equilibria.
3and thus aﬀects the constitutional choice of social insurance. In section 6,
we look at the possibility of prohibiting it at the constitutional level and we
present a numerical example.
2T h e b a s i c m o d e l
The society consists of an identical number of three types of individuals.
An individual of type i is characterized by his (exogenous) income level wi,
with w1 <w 2 <w 3.3 In order to focus on redistributive social insurance,
we do not explicitly consider the possibility of redistributing income through
an income tax.4 However, one can interpret the wi’s as income levels after
income taxation.
Individuals can be in two states of the world. In the ﬁrst, they earn wi
and in the second, they have no income and must rely on insurance beneﬁts.
To keep the notation simple, we assume that they all face the probability 1/2
to be in either state.5 Assuming further that they have identical preferences
over disposable income ci and insurance beneﬁts bi; their utility function is
given by
U(ci,b i)=u(ci)+u(bi)( 1 )
where u is strictly concave (and increasing). Further, we assume that the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion Rr(x)=−xu00(x)/u0(x)i sn o n - d e c r e a s i n g
and larger than one.6 Beneﬁts bi = b
p
i+bs
i represent the sum of private and so-
cial insurance beneﬁts. Private beneﬁts b
p
i are determined by an individual’s





where θi ≥ 0 is the proportion of income invested in private insurance, while
ρp is the rate of return of such insurance. Social insurance is ﬁnanced by a
3Our analysis can easily be extended to the case of a continuous distribution of incomes.
This does not aﬀect the results but makes their derivation more technical and less intuitive.
4This would call for endogenous labor supply and would complicate the analysis.
5This is a stylized representation of a more complex setting in which each type i is
characterized by wi and pi, the probability of losing his earning capacity. In such a
setting, a crucial parameter is the correlation between w and p. For sickness, disability
and unemployment, this is likely to be negative. In this case, one can show that the median
income earner can oppose redistribution even when his income is below average income.
6Both of these assumptions are standard and generally considered as “realistic”.
4proportional payroll tax at rate t ≥ 0a n db e n e ﬁts are given by
b
s
i = t[(1 − α)w + αwi], (3)
where w =( w1+w2+w3)/3 is the mean income while α ∈ [0,1] is the Bismar-
ckian factor. Observe that (3) takes into account the budget constraint of the
public sector (requiring that average contributions equal average beneﬁts).7
With α = 0, social insurance is fully redistributive and everyone receives
the same beneﬁts tw (which equal the average contribution). On the other
hand when α = 1, individual beneﬁts are equal to individual contributions
and there is no redistribution of income. In reality, there is no country with
α = 1 or 0; what prevails is a mixture of these two canonical types of social
insurance. This is why we study the possibility of α being between 0 and
1. Social beneﬁt sa r et h e nac o n v e xc o m b i n a t i o no fa v e r a g ea n di n d i v i d u a l
contributions and a higher value of α represents a less redistributive social
insurance system.
Observe that the rate of return of private insurance is the same for all
types (income levels), while social insurance implies a rate of return which is






(1 − α)+α]. (4)
Not surprisingly, ρs
i is a decreasing function of wi,u n l e s sα = 1 (“pure”
Bismarckian system). Further, one can easily verify that the “average return”
of social insurance equals one (government’s budget constraint).8
7When, as discussed in footnote 5, diﬀerential loss probabilities are introduced, the
utility function of type i is given by:
U(ci,b i)=( 1− pi)u(ci)+piu(bi).



















These expressions reduce to (1)—(3) when pi =1 /2.




5Throughout the paper we shall assume that ρp < 1: private insurance is
costlier than public insurance. This assumption may, at ﬁrst, appear some-
what surprising. Many economists believe that the public sector tends to be
less eﬃcient than the private sector. This belief is one of the main rationales
for privatization. However, in the case of ﬁnancial intermediation, insur-
ance and banking, one often observes that the public sector is cheaper than
the private sector for two main reasons. First, social insurance is generally
managed through a single administration, as opposed to private insurance
which is provided by a number of companies. Consequently, social insurance
beneﬁts from sizeable scale economies. Second, the private insurance market
devotes a lot of resources to advertisement, which is not the case for social
insurance. These arguments are conﬁrmed by a number of empirical studies.
It is important to realize that the key eﬃciency enhancing feature here is the
collective and “monopolistic” nature of social insurance.9
The arguments of the utility function can now be expressed in the follow-
ing way:
ci = wi(1 − θi − t)a n dbi = wi(ρ
s
it + ρpθi)( 5 )
Consider an individual of wage w and assume for the time being that
h ec a nc h o o s eb o t ht h el e v e lo fs o c i a lp r o t e c t i o n( b ys e t t i n gt,f o rag i v e n
value of α) and his private insurance contribution, θ. This problem provides
a useful benchmark for the study of voting behavior below. The linearity
of expression (5) implies that he will, in general, only choose one type of
insurance. Speciﬁcally, he will choose private insurance (θ>0a n dt =0 )i f
ρp >ρ s, while he prefers social protection (t>0a n dθ =0 )i nt h eo p p o s i t e
case. Recall that ρs (deﬁned by (4)) decreases with w; not surprisingly, low
income individuals are thus more likely to favor social protection. Further-
more, the comparison between the two rates of return depends on the value
of α. In particular, when w/w < ρp < 1, there exists an interior value of α





9This issue of the excess cost associated with a privately managed insurance system has
been particularly studied for social security and health care. Diamond (1992) argues that
these excess costs are not negligible. Mitchell (1998) in her survey shows that they vary
greatly across countries and institutional settings; see also Gouyette and Pestieau (1998).
6Consequently, if α = α(w) individuals of income w are indiﬀerent between
the two types of protection, while all those with lower (res. higher) income
levels strictly prefer social (resp. private) insurance.





(w − w)2 > 0
as long as ρp < 1.
3 Private insurance prohibited
We ﬁrst analyze the case where private insurance is not available. The ob-
jective of this exercise is twofold. First, there are countries where social
insurance, notably in the ﬁeld of health care, is not allowed. Second, if the
availability of private insurance decreas e se xa n t es o c i a lw e l f a r e ,i t sp r o h i b i -
tion might be desirable.10. To deal with this issue it is of course necessary to
separately analyze both cases.
3.1 Voting stage: the choice of t given α
Given α,t h et a xr a t ei sc h o s e nb ym a j o r i t yv o t i n g .W em u s tt h e ni d e n t i f y
the median voter and determine his preferred tax rate.
The preferred payroll tax rate of an individual with earnings w is given
by:11
t
∗(w,α)=a r gm a x
t u[w(1 − t)] + u[t(w + α(w − w)] (7)
For simplicity we shall often use the notation t∗
i(α) ≡ t∗(wi,α), i =1 ,2,3t o
refer to the preferred tax rates of the diﬀerent types.
The ﬁrst- and second-order conditions are:
− u
0(c)w + u
0(b)(w − α(w − w)) = 0 (8)
10Admittedly, redistribution is not the only and probably not the main possible ar-
gument for banning private insurance from, say, health care. Moral hazard (when pri-
vate insurance covers the coinsurance rate) and adverse selection may provide alternative
justiﬁcations.




00(b)(w − α(w − w))
2 < 0( 9 )
where (9) holds for all t ∈ [0,1]. Consequently, the objective function is
concave (preferences are single-peaked) so that a majority voting equilibrium
exists and is determined by the preferred tax rate of the median (pivotal)
voter.
Before proceeding, two remarks about the properties of t∗ are in order.






In words, when α = 1 (pure Bismarckian system with no redistribution) all
types have the same preferred tax rate, namely t =1 /2w h i c ha l l o w sf o r
perfect consumption smoothing across states of nature (c = b).




(w − w)u0(b)(1 − Rr(b))
D
. (11)
Given our assumption on relative risk aversion (Rr > 1), this expression has
t h es a m es i g na sw −w. Consequently, the preferred tax rate is a decreasing
(resp. increasing) function of the Bismarckian factor for individuals with
above-average (resp. below-average) incomes.12
We can now turn to the determination of the voting equilibrium. When
t∗ is a monotonic (increasing or decreasing) function of w,t h em e d i a nv o t e r
is simply the individual with median income (namely w2). To check if this




αu0(b)(1 − Rr(b)) − u0(c)(1 − Rr(c))
−D
(12)







12One can easily verify that a change in α creates conﬂicting income and substitution
eﬀects. With Rr > 1, the income eﬀect dominates and this explains the relationship
between α and t∗.
8One can easily show that this condition is necessarily satisﬁed when w>
w. This property, along with (10) and (11) then implies that when w2 > w
one necessarily has t∗
1(α) <t ∗
2(α) <t ∗
3(α) for any α<1. When w<w,
(13) continues to hold (without any further restrictions required) when α is
suﬃciently close to 0 or 1. However, some additional technical assumptions
are now required to ensure an unambiguous ranking of the diﬀerent types’
preferred tax rates for any value of α. These assumptions are satisﬁed, in
particular, for the class of (exponential) utility functions we consider in the
illustrations below.13
In what follows, we shall concentrate on the case where a median income
individual is eﬀectively the median voter so that the voting equilibrium is
given by t∗
2(α), the preferred tax rate of type 2.
To set the grounds for the analysis of the constitutional stage, note that
t∗
2(α) is increasing or decreasing depending on whether w2 < w or w2 >
w (see expression (11)). In words, an increase in the Bismarckian factor
yields a higher (resp. lower) equilibrium tax rate when the median income is
smaller (resp. larger) than the mean income. Empirically observed income
distributions typically suggest that the median income is lower than the
average income. However, as noted above, when the probability of income
loss is negatively correlated with income, t∗
2(α) can be decreasing even when
w2 < w.14 Furthermore, when dealing with voting, abstention can imply
that the median income of those voting eﬀectively be higher than the average
income. Consequently, the results that emerge when the pivotal voter has
a b o v e - a v e r a g ei n c o m em a yb eo fs o m er e l e v a n c ea n dw es h a l lc o n t i n u et o
consider both case.
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the main res u l t so ft h i ss e c t i o n ;t h e yd e p i c t
the proﬁles of preferred tax rates for both of the considered cases. It might
appear surprising to ﬁnd that higher income people prefer higher tax rate.
However, one has to keep in mind that social insurance is here the only source
of income in the bad state of nature. If the utility function is suﬃciently
concave, high income individuals will then prefer a higher value of b than
poor individuals, even though they pay a higher price for this coverage.15
13Utility functions with constant relative risk aversion provide another example.
14S e ef o o t n o t e5 .
















Figure 2: Proﬁle of preferred tax rates for w2 > w
113.2 Constitutional stage: Rawlsian objective
We now turn to the constitutional stage at which α is determined. Utility
levels are evaluated at the second-stage voting equilibrium induced by the
considered value of α. Some additional notation is needed. First, deﬁne
V
n
i (α,t)=u[wi(1 − t)] + u[t(w + α(wi − w))],i =1 ,2,3, (14)
which speciﬁes the utility of a type i individual as a function of α and t.
The index n is used to point out that there is no private insurance. The
relevant utility level to be considered at the constitutional stage is obtained
by evaluating (14) at t∗
2(α) (the voting equilibrium given by the preferred tax




With a Rawlsian objective, the constitutional problem then consist in
maximizing the utility of the worst-oﬀ individual (namely 1) with respect to
α. Formally, the solution αn
R is deﬁned as
α
n
R =a r gm a x
α {v
n


























This ﬁrst term on the RHS of (15) term measures the direct impact on the
utility of 1 of an increase in α. It is negative because an increase in α implies
a less redistributive system which, not surprisingly, decreases the utility of
the poorest individuals.






which increases with wi. Note that in our setting, the “suﬃcient degree of concavity” is
ensured by the assumption that relative risk aversion is larger than 1.
12Observe in passing that if t were set directly (rather than determined
through voting) only this term would be relevant so that a Beveridgean
system (α = 0) would necessarily be optimal. Now, when t is determined by
voting, the indirect impact through the payroll tax (and the level of coverage)
has to be accounted for; it is captured by the second term on the RHS of (15).
To interpret and sign this term, observe ﬁrst that ∂V n
1 (α,t∗
2(α))/∂t < 0;
this follows from t∗
1(α) <t ∗
2(α) along with the concavity of the individual’s
objective function (7) in the voting problem (see section 3.1). As to dt∗
2/dα,
we know from (11) that it has the same sign as (w −w2). Consequently, the
following two cases have to be distinguished:
• w2 ≤ w
In this case, both terms on the RHS of (15) are negative (for any α)s o
that the optimal solution is given by αn
R = 0. This result is not surprising. As
mentioned above, the direct impact of an increase of α on the utility of type
1 is always negative. Setting a strictly positive Bismarckian factor can only
be desirable if it brings the (voting equilibrium) tax rate closer to type 1’s
preferred rate. Now, when w2 < w an increase in α has exactly the opposite
eﬀect. It brings about a further increase of an already “too high” tax rate
(from type 1’s perspective).
To sum up, a Beveridgean system is optimal. Furthermore, the type of
social protection that emerges from our two stage process is exactly the same
as when t is under direct control of the (Rawlsian) public authority.
• w2 > w
In this case, the two terms on the RHS of (15) are of opposite signs. In
particular, one can easily check that dvn
1(0)/dα now has an ambiguous sign.
Consequently, it is no longer necessarily optimal to set α at zero; an interior
solution is potentially possible though, of course, not guaranteed.16
Analytically, a precise characterization of the type of solution (interior
or corner) is extremely diﬃcult (and not very insightful), even for speciﬁc
utility functions. The only straightforward result is that a corner solution
will prevail when w2 is suﬃciently close to w.17 However, to make our main
16A corner solution at α = 1, on the other hand can easily be ruled out.
17This follows from a simple continuity argument, using the fact that (15) is strictly
negative when w2 = w.
13point, namely that αn
R > 0i se ﬀectively possible, it is suﬃcient to provide
numerical examples, and this will be done in section 6 below.
Anticipating on this, observe that the possibility of an interior solution
conﬁrms one of the points made in the introduction. When αn
R > 0t h e
political process makes it desirable to adopt a social insurance system which
is less redistributive than otherwise optimal. The level of α is then used as a
device to induce a voting equilibrium tax rate (and level of coverage) which
is more suitable to the poor.
3.3 Constitutional stage: utilitarian objective
Let us now reexamine the constitutional choice of α for a utilitarian (rather
than Rawlsian) social welfare function. Using the notation introduced in the
















The constitutional problem consists in determining αn
U that maximizes SWn
U(α)
subject to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.




































The ﬁrst term on the RHS measures the direct impact of a variation of
α on welfare, while the second terms measures the indirect impact, through
the induced variation in the voting equilibrium. Using expression (14), the
deﬁnition of V n

























where cov denotes the covariance. Now, when α>0o n eh a sb3 >b 2 >b 1 so
that (from the strict concavity of u)c o v ( w,u0(b)) < 0. On the other hand,
α = 0 implies b3 = b2 = b1 so that cov(w,u0(b)) = 0. Not surprisingly, the
14direct impact of an increase in α (making the system less redistributive) on
utilitarian welfare is thus negative. Consequently, if the tax rate were directly
set by the utilitarian authority, the optimum would, one again, imply α =0 .
Like in the Rawlsian case, α>0 can only be desirable if it induces a more
“adequate” tax rate in the second stage.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁr s tt e r mo nt h eR H So f( 1 7 )v a n i s h e sa tα =0h a s
another interesting implication. It implies that the derivative at α =0o f


















w h e r ew eh a v ea l s ou s e d∂V n
2 (α,t∗
2(α))/∂t ≡ 0 (which follows directly from
the deﬁnition of t∗
2). Keeping in mind that dSW n
U(0)/dα > 0i sasuﬃcient
conditions for αn
U > 0, expressions (17), (18) and (19) allow us to characterize
αn
U in the following special cases (generated by varying w2 for ﬁxed levels of
w1 and w3):
(i) w2 = w: from (11) one obtains dt∗
2/dα = 0, which implies dSW n
U(0)/dα
=0a n d ,dSW n
U(α)/dα < 0f o rα>0. Consequently, one has αn
U =0
(ii) w>w 2 → w1.I nt h i sc a s e ,t∗
2 → t∗
1 and, at the limit, ∂V n
1 (α,t∗
2(α))/∂t
= 0. Further, one has ∂V n
3 /∂t > 0 (from (12)) and dt∗
2/dα > 0( f r o m( 1 1 ) ) .
Consequently, dSW n
U(0)/dα > 0 which implies αn
U > 0.
(iii) w<w 2 → w3. Following the same reasoning as in (ii), we also get
t h es a m er e s u l tt h a tαn
U > 0.18
To sum up, with a utilitarian objective it may be optimal to set α>0
even if w2 < w. Contrast this with the result in the Rawlsian case (where
w2 < w necessarily implied αn
R = 0). Consequently, a positive α decreases
the utility of the poorest type, but it nevertheless increases expected utility
of the representative individual at the constitutional stage.
A more precise characterization of the conditions under which a positive
α is appropriate does not appear to be possible with general utility functions.
18One now has ∂V n
1 /∂t < 0 but also dt∗
2/dα < 0, so that the sign of the derivative at
zero remains the same as in case (ii).
15-
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Figure 3: Derivative of social welfare at α =0
O n c ea g a i n ,t h en u m e r i c a le x a m p l ei ns e c t i o n6w i l lp r o v i d es o m ef u r t h e ri n -
sights. Anticipating on this, we can “complete” the analysis of dSW n
U(0)/dα
as w2 varies (given w1 and w3) which is initiated through the discussion of
cases (i)—(iii) above. Figure 3, represents the full curve, for the exponential
speciﬁcation considered in section 6. It appears that for this class of utility
functions, αn
U > 0i salways optimal when w2 > w.
4 Private insurance authorized
We now reintroduce the possibility for individuals to buy additional private
insurance if the level of public insurance chosen by the pivotal voter is too low
for them. Recall that private insurance coverage must be positive (θ ≥ 0);
individuals are not allowed to sell back part of their public insurance if they
16feel overinsured. Further, observe that supplementing social insurance by a
private one is not the same as “opting out”: buying private insurance has no
impact on an individuals payroll tax bill. In other words, individuals cannot
replace social insurance by private insurance.
4.1 Voting stage: the choice of t given α
As explained in section 2, individuals with incomes w<w prefer social
insurance over private insurance regardless of the value of α.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
type 1 individuals always prefer social insurance. When w2 < w,t h es a m e
holds for type 2 individuals.
Consider now an individual with income w>w.F o rα =( ρpw−w)/(w−
w), he is indiﬀerent between social and private insurance; see (6). For α<α,
he prefers private insurance; in other words, his preferred payroll tax is t∗ =0 .
On the other hand, for α ≥ α, his preferred payroll tax is given by (7); put
diﬀerently, once θ = 0 individual preferences over payroll tax rates are the
same as when private insurance is prohibited. Denote αi = α(wi), i =2 ,3
for the type 2 and type 3 individuals respectively.
We are now in a position to determine the median voter and hence the
tax rate chosen at the political equilibrium stage for the two cases.
• w2 < w
Individual 2 always prefers social insurance because he beneﬁts from the
redistribution (ρs
2 > 1). For low values of α (α<α3), type 3 individual
prefers private insurance and for α ≥ α3, he has a preferred tax rate t∗
3(α);
s e eF i g u r e4 . 19
For α<α3, type 1 individual is the median voter and the tax rate chosen
by majority vote is t∗
1(α). For α ≥ α3, the situation is the same as when
private insurance is prohibited, and the median voter is of type 2.





1(α)i f 0 ≤ α<α3
t∗
2(α)i f α3 ≤ α ≤ 1 (20)
It is interesting to note that the availability of private insurance can
favor individual 1 (even though he does not eﬀectively buy such insurance).
19As a tie breaking rule, we assume that an individual who is indiﬀerent between private





















Figure 5: Preferred tax rates when private insurance is available and w2 > w
Speciﬁcally, for low values of α, type 1 individual becomes the median voter
and can choose his preferred tax rate.
• w2 > w
The situation is now more complex; see Figure 5. For α<α2,t y p e s2a n d
3 individuals prefer private insurance. consequently, a majority of voters is
in favor of a zero tax rate. For α2 ≤ α<α3, type 1 individual is the median
voter and for α ≥ α3, type 2 individual is the median voter.
In contrast with the previous case, too low values of α c a nl e a dt ot h e
abandonment of social insurance by a coalition 2/3. To sum up, the voting






0i f 0 ≤ α<α2
t∗
1(α)i f α2 ≤ α<α3
t∗
2(α)i f α3 ≤ α ≤ 1
(21)
19Before proceeding, it is interesting to point out that both (20) and (21)
imply te(α) ≤ t∗
2(α). In words, for any given level of α the tax rate with
private insurance is less then or equal to the tax rate that obtains when
only social insurance is available. Put diﬀerently, the availability of private
insurance may decrease and will never increase the degree of generosity of
social protection (as measured by the payroll tax rate). Consequently, it
appears that the availability of private insurance may eﬀectively undermine
political support for a given social protection system.
4.2 Constitutional stage: Rawlsian objective
The analysis of the constitutional stage proceeds along the same lines as in
sections 3.2 and 3.3. However, the type-speciﬁc utility levels achieved in the
second stage have to be redeﬁned to account for the availability of private
insurance. Formally, we deﬁne
V
p
i (α,t)=m a x
θ∈[0,1]
u[wi(1−t−θ)]+u[t(w+α(wi−w))+ρ





i (α,te(α)). Observe that V
p
1 (α,t) ≡ V n
1 (α,t) because indi-




diﬀer for the availability of private insurance may aﬀect the voting equilib-
rium (identity of the median voter).
In the Rawlsian case, the constitutional problem then amounts to deter-
mine 0 ≤ α
p
R ≤ 1w h i c hm a x i m i z e sv
p
1(α). We have to distinguish two cases,
but in each instance, the solution is rather straightforward.
• w2 < w.
Recall that in this case te(0) = t∗
1(0): for α = 0, the poorest individual
is also the median voter in the second stage. Consequently, nothing can
be gained from setting a positive level α and it immediately follows that
α
p
R =0 . 20















1(α), for all α>0.
20Only two candidate solutions need to be considered, namely α =0a n d
α = α2. An argument exactly similar to the one used in the previous case
indeed shows that α>α2 is dominated by α2. Similarly, one easily shows
that 0 <α<α2 is dominated by α =0 .
To compare the utility levels implied by 0 and α2, note that in both cases
type 1 eﬀectively chooses his preferred level of insurance: private for α =0
and social for α = α2.B u tt h e nρs
1 > 1 >ρ p (obtained from (4)) immediately
implies that the utility level is higher for α2. In words, whatever α social
insurance always has a higher rate of return for the low income type. If
α is set “too low”, the second stage voting will imply no social insurance;
consequently, type 1 is left with private insurance. On the other hand, α = α2
ensures a positive level of social protection which, moreover, is precisely type
1’s preferred level.
To sum up, when w2 > w,o n eh a sα
p
R = α2 > 0: it is always optimal to
set a positive level of α at the constitutional stage.
4.3 Constitutional stage: utilitarian objective















and the solution is denoted by α
p
U. Observe that this expression diﬀers in
two respects from (16), its counterpart in the absence of private insurance.
First, unlike V n
i , V
p
i accounts for the individual’s maximization with respect
to private coverage; see (22). Second, with private insurance the median
voter is not necessarily an individual of type 2.










































The ﬁrst term on the RHS of this expression can be rearranged exactly like
in (18), provided that bi’s are properly redeﬁned (to account for private
21One has to keep in mind though that te(α)m a yb ed i s c o n t i n u o u sa tα2 and α3;
consequently, (24) does not apply for these values.
21insurance). Observe that while the covariance term was zero at α =0i nt h e
absence of private insurance, it is now negative for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.22
As in the previous case, α = 0 would be optimal if t were set by the
welfare-maximizing authority. To examine if the political process implies a
diﬀerent result (namely α
p
U > 0 ) ,w eh a v et od i s t i n g u i s ht h eu s u a lt w oc a s e s .
• w2 < w.
As t r a i g h t f o r w a r d( b u ts o m e w h a tt e d i o u s )i n s p e c t i o no f( 2 4 )( m a k i n gu s e
of (20)) makes it clear that no general result can be obtained for this case;
both α
p
U =0a n dα
p
U > 0 are possible. However, compared to the setting
without private insurance (section 3.3) the result α
p
U = 0 appears to be much
“more robust”. Put diﬀerently, somewhat extreme assumptions appear to be
needed to generate a positive Bismarckian factor.23
For instance, α
p
U > 0 can be shown to be optimal if ρp is suﬃciently low
(suﬃciently close to the level which yields θ3 = 0) while at the same time w2
is suﬃciently close to w1.24
• w2 > w.
Now, α =0i m p l i e ste =0 .P u td i ﬀerently, a Beveridgean system induces
a voting equilibrium which implies no social insurance at all.25 Unlike in
the Rawlsian case, it however not always the case that α = α2 dominates
α = 0. Nevertheless, it is easy to show the optimal α continues to be (strictly)
positive. To establish this, we shall now show that α = 1 necessarily yields
a higher welfare than α =0 .
First, observe that combining (21) and (10) yields te(1) = 1/2. Second,




i (1,1/2), i =1 ,2,3.26 Con-




i(0), i =1 ,2,3 which immediately implies that
α = 1 yields a higher level of welfare than α =0 .
22I tc a nb ee a s i l ys h o w nt h a tθ3 >θ 2 ≥ θ1 (except if ρp is so low that θ3 =0 ) .
Consequently, b3 >b 2 >b 1 now holds even when α = 0 (that is when social insurance
beneﬁts are the same for all).
23Recall that the ﬁrst term on the RHS of (24) is negative at α = 0. In addition, one
has ∂V
p
3 /∂t < 0 (while ∂V n
3 /∂t > 0).
24This is because when θ3 → 0, one essentially returns to the setting without private
insurance.
25Provided that α2 > 0, which we assume for simplicity.
26The strict inequality rests on ρp < 1.
22Intuitively, this result can be understood as follows. With a purely Bis-
marckian system, there is no redistribution, but tax rate corresponds to the
preferred category of all types (perfect consumption smoothing). With a
Beveridgean system, on the other hand, there will eﬀectively be no redistri-
bution either (for the tax rate is zero) and all individuals are then left with
the (less eﬃcient) private system.
Observe that while this property implies α
p
U > 0i td o e snot imply that
αp
u = 1. The optimum can well be at a lower level, and speciﬁcally at α2;t h e
numerical example in Section 6 provides illustrates this point.
To sum up, when w2 > w both utilitarian and Rawlsian objectives imply
that it is never optimal to adopt a Beveridgean system. In both case the
adoption of a less redistributive system appears to be the “price to pay” to
ensure the viability of social protection in the voting stage.
5 The welfare impact of private insurance
The previous sections have shown that the availability of private insurance
has a signiﬁcant impact on both the voting and the constitutional stages.
In particular, it has been shown that private insurance tends to reduce the
voting equilibrium tax rate and, hence, the generosity of a given social pro-
tection system. On the other hand, the availability of private insurance may
increase the welfare of the poor (even though they to not eﬀectively buy such
insurance). Finally, it is clear that private insurance in itself tends to increase
welfare by giving individuals an additional option. Consequently, if payroll
taxes were set along with α at the constitutional stage, the availability of
private insurance (even when “ineﬃcient”) would necessarily bring about a
welfare-improvement. We shall now examine to what extent this remains
true if the political process is accounted for.
A n a l y t i c a l l y ,t h i si sr a t h e rd i ﬃcult, and precise results can only be derived
for the Rawlsian objective:
• w2 < w: with or without private insurance, the Rawlsian criterion
implies that a Beveridgean system is chosen (αn
R = α
p
R =0 ) .H o w e v e r ,
the utility of type 1 individuals is higher with private insurance because
he is then the median voter; see sections 3.2 and 4.2. Consequently, in
this case, it is never optimal to prohibit private insurance.
23• w2 > w: the result now depends on ρp, the rate of return of private
insurance. When ρs is large (so that α2 tends to 1), it is always opti-
mal to prohibit private insurance. To see this recall that with private
insurance, a positive level of public insurance arises only if α ≥ α2.
When α2 = 1, one must then set α =1( i m p l y i n gt =1 /2), but this
outcome is also achievable (though of course not optimal) when private
insurance is prohibited. When ρs is small (α2 t e n d i n gt o0 ) ,o nt h e
other hand, the availability of private insurance is necessarily welfare
enhancing; the argument here is exactly similar to the one used above
for the case w2 < w. To sum up, private insurance becomes socially
undesirable when it is rather eﬃcient. In that case it become more
attractive for type 2 individuals and social insurance with a signiﬁcant
degree of redistribution cannot be sustained.
For the utilitarian objective, on the other hand, very few clearcut analyti-
cal results can be obtained. One of the results for the Rawlsian case, however,
can easily be shown to remain valid: with w2 > w and ρp suﬃciently large,
private insurance should be prohibited. For the rest, the comparisons appear
to be ambiguous. The numerical illustration, to which we now turn, conﬁrms
that diﬀerent patterns of results are eﬀectively possible. In particular, when
w2 > w, private insurance may increase or decrease welfare irrespective of
the criterium which is used (Rawls or utilitarian).
6 Numerical examples
A numerical illustration is useful for several reasons. First, it illustrates the
results obtained in the previous sections. Second, it provides some additional
insight regarding the determination of α at the constitutional stage, specif-
ically in those cases where the analytical results appear to be ambiguous.
Third, it yields some answers to the question of whether or not (and when)
supplementary private insurance ought to be allowed.
Our benchmark example is as follows:
• u(x)=−e−δx with δ =1 ;
• ρp =0 .9
24w2 < ww 2 > w
without with priv. ins. without with priv. insur.
Rawls α =0 α =0 α =0 .261 α = α2 =0 .475
t =0 .434 t =0 .406 t =0 .532 t =0 .413
v1 = −0.082 v1 = −0.081 v1 = −0.102 v1 = −0.085
Utilitarism α =0 .021 α =0 α =0 .31 α = α2 =0 .475
t =0 .435 t =0 .406 t =0 .530 t =0 .413
sw = −0.054 sw = −0.048 sw = −0.036 sw = −0.030
Table 1: Benchmark scenario
• two wage distributions: (w1,w 2,w 3)i se i t h e r( 5 ,6,15), implying that
w2 < w =8 .66 or (5,14,15) implying that w2 > w =1 1 .33.
The results are summarized in Table 1. It appears that when w2 < w
the α chosen at the constitutional stage is always zero (fully redistributive
social insurance scheme) except for the utilitarian criterion when private
insurance is prohibited (section 3.3). When w2 > w, on the other hand, the
Bismarckian factor is always strictly p o s i t i v ea n db i g g e rw i t ht h a nw i t h o u t
private insurance.
Furthermore, it is always optimal to allow private insurance. For the
cases where w2 < w this does not come as a surprise and merely conﬁrms the
analytical results of Section 5. For the remaining case, no analytical results
were obtained and the examples show that private insurance may eﬀectively
be welfare improving in these settings.
To complete the picture, it is now interesting to provide an illustration
of the opposite result, namely that the prohibition of private insurance may
be appropriate. To achieve this, just change one parameter of the model,
namely the degree of eﬃciency of private insurance ρp which is set to 0.95
instead of 0.9. Table 2 summarizes the results for the relevant case, namely
w2 > w.
We now obtain the result that a more eﬃcient private insurance sys-
tem becomes socially undesirable. This comes from the fact that private
insurance is now very attractive for type 2 individuals and some substantial
redistribution is only possible when this private insurance is prohibited.
This example documents the importance of the political process in a
25w2 > w
without with priv. insur.
Rawls α =0 .261 α = α2 =0 .737
t =0 .532 t =0 .453
v1 = −0.102 v1 = −0.114
Utilitarism α =0 .31 α = α2 =0 .737
t =0 .530 t =0 .453
sw = −0.036 sw = −0.039
Table 2: More eﬃcient private insurance
particularly striking way. If the tax rate were set directly by the (welfare
maximizing) public authorities, the availability of private insurance could
only be welfare improving. Furthermore, a more eﬃcient private system can
only result in a more signiﬁcant welfare improvement. When tax rates are
determined through majority voting, on the other hand, both of these results
may be reversed. Private insurance is no longer necessarily desirable–the
fact that its availability undermines political support for social insurance
may dominate its positive eﬀects on welfare. Furthermore, a more eﬃcient
private system may now proof to be worse for it exacerbates the negative
impact on political support.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have attempted to study the type of social insurance that
would result from a two-stage constitutionalist approach. We deﬁne social
insurance by two key characteristics: its redistributiveness and its generosity.
The generosity represents the amount of resources that society is prepared
to devote to social insurance; it is measured by the payroll tax rate. A tax
increase has two eﬀects: beneﬁts increase but at the same time disposable
income decreases. The redistributiveness represents the extent of redistribu-
tion that social insurance can implement for a given amount of resources; it
is inversely related to the Bismarckian factor.
In our two-stage procedure, the Bismarckian factor is chosen at the con-
26w2 < ww 2 > w
without with priv. insur. without with priv. insur.
Rawls α =0 α =0 α ≥ 0 α = α2
Utilitarism α ≥ 0 α ≥ 0 α>0 α ≥ α2
Table 3: The optimal level α in the diﬀerent cases
stitutional level on the basis of either a Rawlsian or a utilitarian social welfare
function. The tax rate is then chosen at the second stage by majority voting.
The main results are summarized in Table 3 and they depend on sev-
eral factors: the distribution of wage, the concavity of the individual utility
function, the social objective but also whether or not social insurance can
be supplemented by private insurance. In words, the main conclusions that
have emerged are the following. First, it may be appropriate to adopt a
system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure
political support for an adequate level of coverage in the second stage. Sec-
ond, as expected, private insurance does undermine the political support for
social insurance. Third, supplementary private insurance may nevertheless
increase the welfare of the poor, even if it is eﬀectively bought only by the
rich. Fourth, and last, the case for prohibiting (supplementary) private insur-
ance may become stronger when the eﬃciency of private insurance markets
increases.
From an economic policy perspective, the main lesson that emerges is
that the political process may have a signiﬁcant impact on the design of
redistributive policies. It may make it desirable to adopt less redistribu-
tive social protection or to prohibit otherwise eﬃcient supplementary private
insurance systems.
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